By 1982 Eisenhower’s reputation had changed (though he himself had died in 1969). In that year, another historians’ survey of the presidents put him ninth out of thirty-eight chief executives. What had happened? What factors could affect a president’s reputation so much after he had already served? His accomplishments were in the books; his actions had not changed.

A few things other things had happened, though. First of all, many of the presidents of the 1960s and 1970s made most other presidents look comparatively good, especially those who, like Eisenhower, presided over peace and prosperity. More importantly, historians were able to examine new sources, the internal papers of the Eisenhower presidency. These memos, reports, and agendas might have appeared unexciting on the surface, but they revealed more about how the Eisenhower administration actually worked. As Arthur Schlesinger Jr. concluded, these records “unquestionably alter the old picture. We may stipulate at once that Eisenhower showed much more energy, interest, self-confidence, purpose, cunning, and command than many of us supposed in the 1950s; that he was the dominant figure in his administration whenever he wanted to be (and he wanted to be more often than it seemed at the time).”2

How can we reconcile this behind-the-scenes activity with the much duller public image many Americans had of Eisenhower at the time? The historian Fred Greenstein called Eisenhower’s presidency “the hidden hand.”3 The president ran the show but chose not to display it publicly, often letting others take the attention-grabbing public actions. In fact, sometimes he used his clumsy public image to mask what the administration was up to. On one occasion, when aides were worried about what he might say during a press conference, Ike told them, “Don’t worry . . . if that question comes up, I’ll just confuse them.” And he did. One of his answers in that conference was, “The only thing I know about war are two things.”4 Another historian called this strategy “calculated obfuscation.”5

Why would a president choose to run his administration in such an indirect style? First of all, Eisenhower felt that when duty called, he should serve his country. He was alarmed by the isolationism of prominent Republicans such as Robert Taft and the extremism of Communist hunters such as Senator McCarthy. Once elected, he felt the president should be someone who united the country, not someone who divided it. He personally chose to stay above the political combat that was often a part of lawmaking. So others, such as his vice president, Richard Nixon, gave the hard-edged speeches or took the confrontational line while Eisenhower, the admired hero of World War II, remained above it all. Though he did care about his reputation and legacy, this arrangement was not so much for his own personal glory as it was to hold together what could become a very divided nation (as the sixties would soon show).

Ike’s approach often worked. He instructed his officials not to cooperate with Senator McCarthy’s investigations into Communist influence in the government but did not say anything publicly about it. Stonewalled, McCarthy lost power and public approval in the second year of Eisenhower’s presidency.

However, Eisenhower’s understated approach also meant the president did not publicly defend good friends and dedicated public servants, such as George C. Marshall, when McCarthy accused them of disloyalty. On civil rights issues, Eisenhower first used private negotiations with the governor of Arkansas, Orval Faubus, to take care of integration at Central High School in Little Rock. Only when things did not go as Ike expected did he send in soldiers to make sure the black students could safely attend school.

The president used a similar approach in foreign affairs. While he let Secretary of State Dulles and others publicly declare that the United States was going to roll back Communism with massive retaliation, in private Eisenhower sought to reduce tensions with the Soviets. He met with Khrushchev at Geneva in 1955, the first time since Potsdam a decade earlier that the leaders of the two superpowers met face-to-face. This paved the way for Khrushchev’s visit to the U.S. in 1959 and raised expectations for major agreements at the Paris Conference of 1960. The U-2 Incident shot down any chance for those agreements to happen, but Eisenhower’s careful diplomacy had come close.

Question 2: From what you know now about Eisenhower, do you think he was overrated or underrated by being ranked ninth of thirty-eight presidents in the 1982 historians’ poll? Why?

Overal: Question 3: What does this trip through the interpretations of Eisenhower’s presidency make you think about history and our ability to know what happened in the past?

PLEASE HELP 70 POINTS IF ANSWERED FULLY